



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF



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8 APRIL 1965

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DAILY BRIEF  
8 APRIL 1965

1. Vietnam

U-2 photography of 5 April has provided the first solid evidence of a SAM site in North Vietnam. The site is about 15 miles southeast of Hanoi and is in the late stages of construction. No missile equipment was noted, however. Much of the area was cloud covered and a complete search for other sites was not possible.

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Press sources have been quoting Soviet officials in Moscow as saying that Soviet military equipment is definitely en route to North Vietnam. The officials allegedly claim that "procedural" difficulties with Peiping have been cleared up.

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## 2. North Vietnam

Yesterday's appointment of North Vietnamese politburo member and Deputy Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh as foreign minister upgrades the status of this post, held since 1961 by Central Committee members who ranked relatively low on Hanoi's power ladder. At the least, it probably means that Hanoi anticipates or intends a new intensification of activity in the international political and diplomatic arena. Until Trinh begins showing his hand, however, it is too early to determine what significance his appointment may have regarding an intention to initiate negotiations over South Vietnam. An analysis is at Annex.

## 3. South Vietnam

A small group of disgruntled subordinate naval commanders-- [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] --have apparently 50X1  
succeeded in getting Admiral Cang and his deputy relieved from command of the navy.

[redacted] 50X1  
Press reports that a "mutiny" has occurred seem luridly overdrawn, since not a shot has been fired, nor voices raised in anger.

The Armed Forces Council is to meet urgently to discuss the charges against Cang. [redacted]

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#### 4. President's Speech

Communist reactions to the President's 7 April speech are only beginning to come in and so far provide no real key to the Communist response.

Hanoi has not yet been heard from. Peiping, in an initial domestic broadcast this afternoon, quoted passages of the speech, but branded it as "full of lies and fraud." The broadcast said the offer to discuss Vietnam without conditions was "old stuff with new decorations," whose aim was to allow US troops to carry out their "aggression."

Moscow has broadcast several sparse press items on the speech, but has not yet commented authoritatively. Party leader Brezhnev, in a speech today in Warsaw which denounced US policy in Vietnam and asserted Moscow's readiness to assist North Vietnam in "strengthening its defenses," avoided any mention of the President's remarks.


#### 5. Berlin

Bonn is still considering holding the 28-30 April meeting of the West German upper house--the Bundesrat--in West Berlin. A decision is likely tomorrow. An affirmative decision would probably provoke a continuation or an intensification of the Communist harassing activities of the past few days.

#### 6. Bolivia

Hernan Siles' Nationalist Revolutionary Movement may try to stage demonstrations in La Paz tomorrow, despite the junta's decree prohibiting them. The junta has taken security precautions, but some violence may occur. Siles seems bent on forcing junta president Barrientos to form a political alliance with his party and is testing the junta's nerve.

#### 7. Cyprus



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ANNEX

Hanoi's New Foreign Minister

Nguyen Duy Trinh, 55, was born in southern Vietnam and fought there with the Viet Minh against the French. Considered a most competent technician, he has long been a top economic administrator, holding the regime's top planning post since 1958. He has been one of five deputy premiers since 1961, during the past year the most active public figure in this group, and a member of the eleven-man party politburo since 1957.

Xuan Thuy, replaced as foreign minister on the grounds of ill health, has been absent for several months from official functions where he might have been expected to put in an appearance and may indeed be ill. However, Xuan Thuy has apparently served more as a spokesman and factotum than as a policy maker. There is no doubt that his replacement by a man with Trinh's credentials upgrades the foreign ministry post, which, since 1961 when it was relinquished by present Premier Pham Van Dong, has been held by men of lesser stature.

This undoubtedly means Hanoi sees a forthcoming period of intense international political and diplomatic activity and that the regime therefore wishes to place the conduct of its foreign relations in the hands of a man high in its counsels.

Beyond this, until Trinh tips his hand, publicly or through diplomatic channels, it is difficult to determine the significance of his appointment and whether or not Hanoi intends to change direction in its policy.

Trinh has not been prominent in the party polemics between the hard-line pro-Peiping and the more moderate pro-Moscow factions. He has worked closely with the Soviets in negotiating economic agreements, has been to Moscow at least four times, and has written of the need for close bloc economic cooperation. Some observers have characterized him as a hard-line extremist, basing this primarily on his delivery of several pro-Chinese speeches in Albania. He may lean personally toward the militant and uncompromising position of the pro-Peiping faction, but the evidence is not convincing.

On the other hand, his earlier southern history and his past personal identification with the resistance movement in the south could imply that Hanoi foresees or intends new developments in its relationships with the Viet Cong and the south which might overshadow in importance its relationships elsewhere.

Several previous changes in the foreign ministry post have subsequently seemed to foreshadow changes in the course of North Vietnamese policy. In 1963, for example, a probable "moderate" was dumped in favor of Xuan Thuy, regarded by some observers as more pro-Chinese. Somewhat later, a shift in North Vietnamese foreign policy toward Chinese views did become evident.

More indications are required before we can attempt to read a change in policy direction into yesterday's appointment.

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